STRENGTHS AND LIMITS
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I will divide my remarks into two separate but related segments.
The first focuses on the strengths of policy analysis and public management: What is distinctive about the field? Where are we in its development? And where are we heading?
I hope these initial comments will both reflect and generate some degree of confidence and optimism about the field and its prospects.
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They are intended to be a moderate sales pitch for what we are about--both as practitioners and as scholars.
In the second part, I will present a paradox and a puzzle about the field and its interaction with the realities of government.
The puzzle will suggest something about the limitations of the field.
The answer I will propose for resolving the puzzle should add a touch of humility to the confidence and optimism generated in the first part of my remarks.
I.
New Management, and at the beginning of the twelfth academic year of the first formal graduate programs in the field.
I have elsewhere described policy analysis as the application of scientific methods to problems of public policy, choice, and implementation in domestic, international and national security affairs.
Its successful pursuit depends on familiarity with the social sciences, economics, and the physical sciences, competence in a number of analytical techniques, and the ability and confidence to move across disciplinary lines. This is certainly a formidable set of attributes! Mastering them is, of course, a matter of degree, and none of us aspires to be equally expert in all of these dimensions. In any event, excellence in the field requires a demanding and delicate balance of aptitudes, formal training, and experience.
There are, I believe, six characteristics that differentiate our field from the other disciplines and professions which adjoin it, and which have contributed to its development. 
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or the costs and benefits of computer-assisted tomography, without understanding the complex technologies involved.)
Finally, policy analysis has become closely associated with programmatic experimentation (for example, in the fields of welfare, health, housing, and military manpower).
As the foregoing list suggests, what is special about policy analysis and public management, and what differentiates it from the other disciplines with which it is associated and from which it has benefited, is a combination of attributes, rather than any single one. It is precisely this combinatior which provides policy analysis as a field, and its professional practitioners, with encouraging prospects for growth, development, and influence. For the cardinal issues and problems which confront us--both nationally and internationally--display in abundance the multiple facets and complexities that I've been talking about, rather than fitting neatly within the boundaries of the established disciplines.
The six attributes I have listed define the special qualities and capabilities of our field. They add up to a powerful armamentarium for addressing--perhaps "clarifying," or "illuminating," would be better and so on.
These six attributes also indicate not only where the field of policy analysis and public management currently is, but the direction in which we are heading. For all of these attributes plainly need further refinement and development, both as to technique and application.
This is of course a demanding agenda: for policy practitioners, for the public policy schools, for their faculties, and for students.
This developmental agenda will place heavy demands on our curricula and faculties, especially in a period of current and likely budget stringencies. Even so, I think this agenda must be expanded still further in two additional directions if the field is to flourish rather than wane in the decade ahead.
Policy analysis and management, you will recall, developed in the context of the fervent concern for domestic and urban problems in the 1960s. As part of the legacy of Vietnam, the field involved an avoidance of, even hostility toward, international and military issues, notwithstanding the fact that methodologically and intellectually policy analysis owed a bountiful debt to the previous development of systems analysis and planning-prograining-and-budgeting in connection with defense programs.
As part of the current developmental agenda for policy analysis and public management, there is clearly a compelling need to broaden and enlarge the horizon of the academic field by adding international and defense policy issues to our central curricular and research concerns.
one reason for this necessary addition is that the links between domestic and international policies and programs are remarkably strong in many areas, such as energy, technology, productivity, the international transmission of inflation, interactions between the defense and civil sectors of our own economy and society, as well as those of our allies. Hence, understanding and advancing understanding of the domestic issues requires attention to their international and defense ramifications, as well.
Another reason for broadening the horizon is that the progratmmatic experience and data of other countries can be of substantial benefit to our own efforts and analysis in many of these fields. We are all too prone to the intellectual disability of assuming that, if programs, experience, and data don't have a "made-in-America" label on them, they can be safely ignored.
Let me next turn to the paradox and puzzle I mentioned at the outset.
I doubt that I will find much disagreement in this audience with the proposition that there has been substantial improvement and significant development in the study and practice of policy analysis over the past decade.
The technical training we are providing in our various curricula has continually grown richer, more powerful, and more proficient.
There has been a similar improvement in the practice of policy analysis as a craft and as a profession. We are performing "better" research and analysis, "better" in the sense that our methods are more sophisticated, our data sets larger and more accurate, our computer hardware and software more powerful, and the options, objectives, and outcomes that we scrutinize are much broader than they used to be.
The paradox is simply this: While our capabilities, our analysis, our training, and our craft have all improved impressively, the reality of public policy as it has shaped up over the past ten or twelve years, has come to display a disarray that might be likened to Brownian movement.
The result is a profoundly sad and sorry condition of the public policy domain, one that represents a combination of good intentions with perverse outcomes.
I think one comes to this unhappy evaluation regardless of which domain of public policy one considers: economic policy, energy policy, national security policy, alliance policy, welfare policy, health policy, urban policy, and so on. I daresay the same conclusion was arrived at by a large majority of the electorate in its decision to place Ronald Reagan in the Presidency last November.
In other words, if we're so smart and proficient in the training and practice of policy analysis and management, why hasn't public policy improved over the past decade? What is the explanation for our shortfall? What is the source of our public policy confusion?
I am reminded of a story about a professor who labored through a long and involved proof in one of his courses, when one of his students raised his hand and said, "I'm sorry, I don't think I understand. I am confused. Would you mind going through that again?"
So the professor laboriously repeated the explanation and proof, and then turned to the student and said, "Now do you understand?" "No," responded the student, "but my confusion is at a higher level!"
Is the explanation for the paradox simply that our improved analysis and technical training have only served to raise the level of our confusion, and to make our perplexity more sophisticated?
Perhaps there is something to this, but I think the explanation is more fundamental.
The proposition I would like to suggest to you to explain the puzzle is this: the reason for the disarray of public policy that * has arisen in the past decade, contemporaneously with the improvement in the practice and training of public policy analysis, lies in the profound diseconomies of scale to which government is prone.
Government is a special kind of "industry." Like other kinds, it is subject to economies and diseconomies of scale. As an industry engaged in certain special kinds of production processes, government is associated with certain characteristics that apply to the demand for its activities,.as well as to the supply of these activities. IThe supply-side characteristics principally concern us here; they suggest vhy there are significant diseconomies of scale in connection with government activities and programs.
Among the relevant characteristics pertaining to the supply of government activities are the following:
First, the outputs that are sought through government activities are often hard to define in prir'cipal, ill-defined in practice, and There are other characteristics associated with the supply of government output, but these two will suffice for my present purpose.
They limit the scope for decentralization in the conduct of the government's business.
Because the measures of performance for government output are elusive and, at best, are usually only proxies for the "final" results that are sought, and because there is rarely effective competition between governmental suppliers for a particular category of output, there are distinct limits on the degree of decentralization that is both feasible in the conduct of government business, yet consistent with effective conduct of that business.
Government policy and its programmatic implementation confronts the following dilemma:
On the one hand, the scope for decentralization is limited by the difficulty of designing suitable performance criteria that accurately and precisely reflect the intended purposes of policy or legislation, and that are resistant to being misinterpreted (inadvertently or advertently), or circumvented, or "gamned" and distorted, by those to whom responsibility is delegated.
The scope for effective decentralization in government is also limited by the absence of effective competition for the services that In somewhat technical terms, one might think of a logistic function relating the scale of government to its performance: performance may improve over a certain range as government activities expand, thereafter the improvement will continue at a diminished rate, peak, and then begin to fall.
Although the impressive tools of our craft as they have developed and are continuing to develop may help to shift this curve, I doubt very much that they can change its shape. We should be realistic about how much these tools can accomplish if we are on the negative slope of the curve! I conclude that we, as scholars and practitioners of policy analysis and public management, should carry along with our professional prowess a becoming degree of humility, lest we overtax the demands placed on government and the public policy profession.
In conclusion, let me offer you a concrete, and surely controversial, example of what I am driving at.
In an address delivered at the 330th commencement exercises of one of our most outstanding universities last June, the distinguished president of that university referred in the following terms to two responsibilities of government which he characterized as critically important:
.. the Federal government should make certain that our ablest and most promising young men and women have the opportunity to obtain the best possible preparation for callings that are important to a healthy, progressive society. In addition, the Federal government must take steps to insure that the highest quality of research can proceed in broad fields of inquiry that are important to the welfare of the nation."
